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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LANSON ROY PRATT, 




NATURE OF CASE 
Defendant was charged in the Juvenile Court of 
Davis County, State of Utah, with contributing to the 
delinquency of Nelda Pratt, a minor, on or about August 
1, 1969, in that: Number 1. He did give, sell or other-
wise supply to Nelda Pratt, a person under the age of 21 
years, an alcoholic beverage in violation of U.C.A. 32-7-
15. 
2. He did cause Nelda Pratt, a minor under the age 
of 21 years, to be delinquent by causing her to pose nude 
in a lewd and suggestive manner, and taking photo-
graphic pictures at such time and in a manner likely to 
I 
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cause serious injury to the morals of said minor in viola-
tion of U.C.A. 1953, 55-10-80. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Count 1 was dismissed on motion of counsel at the 
conclusion of the evidence and defendant was found guilty 
by the Court sitting without a jury on Count No. 2 of 
causing Nelda Pratt, a minor under the age of 21 years 
to be delinquent by causing her to pose nude in a lewd 
and suggestive manner and taking photographic pictures 
at such time and in a manner likely to cause serious inju-
ries to the morals of said minor in violation of U.C.A. 55-
10-80. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the verdict of the Court 
and a granting of defendant's motion of acquittal or fail-
ing that, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 1969 (Tr. 5, 13, Complaint) one 
Nelda Pratt, under the age of 18 years, was invited by 
her brother's wife, Lavonne Pratt, to Lavonne's home in 
Woods Cross, Utah (Tr. 3). While there she was fur-
nished drinks containing alcohol by Lavonne and a man 
named Harold Zesiger <Tr. 5, 33). Lavonne then sug-
gested that Nelda pose in the nude so that pictures could 
be taken of her (Tr. 5). Pictures were taken of Nelda in 
the nude (Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7). Nelda Pratt stated 
that while the pictures were being taken she thought 
some other man was present and holding the light that 
looked like Roy, the defendant, but she was not sure (Tr. 
6). Nelda also testified that Roy Pratt did not cause her 
to pose in any way (Tr. 36); did not take any pictures of 
2 
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her <Tr. 36) and that she could not say with any cer-
tainty that the defendant, Roy Pratt, was even present 
when the said Nelda Pratt was posing and the pictures 
were being taken <Tr. 34, 36, 43, 44). All of the events 
that transpired on the day of August 1, 1969, insofar as 
they pertain to the allegations of the Complaint, occurred 
between the hours of 9 o'clock p.m., on August 1, 1969, 
and 2:30 a.m., on August 2, 1969 <Tr. 3, 39, 40, 44). 
One Harold Zesiger was the only other witness called 
by the state and he stated that on August 1, 1969, he, 
Zcsiger, Roy Pratt, Lavonne and Nelda were at the home 
of Lavonne and Roy Pratt <Tr. 10>; that he, Zesiger, took 
the pictures of Nelda and was assisted by Roy and La-
vonne Pratt <Tr. 13). Defendant testified that on the day 
in question, August 1, 1969, he went to his place of em-
ployment in Salt Lake City and worked from 4 o'clock 
p.m. to 2 o'clock a.m. on the following day, August 2 
(Tr. 18); that he arrived home at approximately 2:20 
a.m., and upon entering the house was handed a lamp 
to hold by his wife; she turned it on and he saw what 
was happening and he thereupon left the room and went 
to bed (Tr. 20). Later, he found the pictures that had 
been taken that night and delivered them to the Woods 
Cross Police Department (Tr. 40). At all times men-
tioned herein, Lavonne Pratt and Roy Pratt were in the 
process of obtaining a divorce (Tr. 4). 
Besides testifying himself, the defendant called Mr. 
Joseph Whittaker, Department Superintendent at his 
place of employment who testified that defendant Pratt 
was at his place of employment in S~1 It Lake City from 
3:45 p.m., on August 1 to 2:01 a.m., on August 2, 1969 
<Tr. 53). Mr. Ronald Hichanls, a fellow employee, who 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
works on the same machine with Mr. Pratt confirmed the 
testimony of both Mr. Pratt and Mr. Whittaker that Mr. 
Pratt was at his place of employment on the day and dur-
ing the hours when the alleged offenses occurred (Tr. 57). 
At the conclusion of the State's evidence, defend-
ant's counsel moved for a Dismissal on the grounds of 
insufficiency of evidence and that the statute 55-10-80 
U.C.A. was unconstitutional in that it was vague and 
indefinite in that there was no definition as to what con-
stitutes delinquency. The motion was denied by the 
Court. 
At the conclusion of defendant's evidence the motion 
was renewed and was again denied by the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
PmNT I. THAT THE STATUTE U.C.A. 1953 55-
10-80 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT IS 
VAGUE AND INDEFINITE. 
The defendant was charged that he did cause Nelda 
Pratt, a minor under the age of 21 years, to be delinquent. 
The statute 55-10-80 (I) reads as follows: 
"Any person eighteen years of age or over who 
induces, aids, or encourages a child to violate any 
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, 
or who tends to cause children to become or re-
main delinquent, or who aids, contributes to, or 
becomes responsible for the neglect or delinquency 
of any child * * * *" 
The statute does not, in any way, attempt to define what 
"delinquent" means. There is, in fact, no statutory defi-
nition of the terms "delinquency" or "delinquent". The 
determination of what is meant by these terms and as to 
whether or not, in fact, such delinquency has occurred is 
4 
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left entirely to the individual feeling, opinion or definition 
of the individual Judges of the State of Utah and the 
accused is completely without any guidance whatsoever 
from the language used in the statute. 
Prior to 1965 Sec. 55-10-6, U.C.A. 1953 contained a 
definition of what "delinquent child" might be. How-
ever, in 1965, when the legislature adopted the code for 
the Juvenile Court, no definition of the term "delin-
quency" or "delinquent child" was included in the sta-
tute comprising the juvenile code. 
As the statute now stands, one can only surmise 
what is meant by these terms and no accused should be 
left upon such a shaky premise to determine whether or 
not he has or may violate a law. Am. Jr. 2d Vol. 16, Sec. 
552, p. 952: 
"The due process requirement of definiteness is 
especially important in its application to penal and 
criminal statutes. The legislature, in the exercise 
of its power to declare what shall constitute a crime 
or punishable offense, must inform the citizen with 
reasonable precision what acts it intends to pro-
hibit so that he may have a certain understand-
able rule of conduct and know what acts it is his 
duty to avoid." 
Am. Jur. 2d. Vol. 16, Sec. 552, p. 954: 
"The Constitutional requirement of definiteness is 
violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute 
* * * *. The uncertainty in a statute which will 
amount to a denial of due process of law is not 
the difficulty of ascertaining whether close cases 
fall within or without the prohibition of the sta-
tute, but whether the standard established by the 
5 
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statute is so uncertain that it cannot be determined 
with reasonable definiteness that any particular 
act is disapproved." 
See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Tuckett in 
State of Utah vs. A. G. Tritt, 463 P. 2d. 806, 809. 
POINT 2. THE ST ATE DID NOT PROVE BE-
YOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DE-
FENDANT CAUSED NELDA PRATT TO POSE IN 
THE NUDE IN A LEWD AND SUGGESTIVE MAN-
NER AND TOOK PHOTOGRAPHIC PICTURES OF 
HER AT SUCH TIME. 
Because Count No. I was dismissed on motion of 
defendant's counsel at the conclusion of all the evidence, 
the remaining argument will be confined to the evidence 
as it pertains to Count No. 2. 
The only two witnesses called by the State were 
Nelda Pratt and Harold Zesiger. Harold Zesiger was 
admittedly an accomplice (Tr. 12, 13, 14). 
Sec. 77-31-18 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony 
of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by other 
evidence which in itself and without the aid of 
the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense 
and the corroboration shall not be sufficient if it 
merely shows the commission of the offense or 
the circumstances thereof." 
This statute was interpreted in State vs. Vigil 260 
P. 2d 539 <Utah) wherein it was stated: 
"In State vs. Irwin IOI Utah 365, 120 P. 2d. 285, 
this Court stated that the corroboration need not 
go to all the material facts as testified by the ac-
6 
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complice, nor need it be sufficient in itself to sup-
port a conviction; it may be slight and entitled to 
little consideration, however, the corroborating 
evidence must connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense, State vs. Lay 38 Utah 
143, 110 P. 2d, 986; and be consistent with his 
guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. State 
vs. Butterfield 70 Utah 529, 261 P. 804. The cor-
roborating evi<lence must do more than cast a 
grave suspicion on the defendant and it must do 
all of these things without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice." 
Disregarding the testimony of the accomplice then, 
the only evidence in the State's case from the mouth of 
the only other witness, Nelda Pratt, was found on page 
6 of the transcript, as follows: 
"Q. Did anyone assist Harold in taking the 
pictures? 
A. Lavonne did. 
Q. What did she do? 
A. She held the light and she suggested poses 
and she put down the sheets and every-
thing. 
Q. I see. Did Roy participate in any regard? 
A. Well, I'm not sure, really, but I think I 
saw some other man holding some lights 
that looked like Roy, but I'm not sure" 
(emphasis ours). 
It is elementary that to support a finding of guilt in 
this matter, the defendant must be found guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Surely, there can be no sincere con-
tention that the above quoted statement from Nelda Pratt 
was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support such 
7 
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finding of guilt. On the contrary, such a statement could 
support only a finding of innocence. 
In finding the defendant guilty, apparently the Court 
misunderstood the testimony of Nelda Pratt in that he 
assumed that the defendant was present in the room 
while the pictures were being taken (Tr. 64). And this 
was not the fact. For the above reasons, defendant's Mo-
tion to dismiss the Complaint and both charges thereof 
should have been granted. 
POINT 3. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMIS-
SAL AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL OF THE EVI-
DENCE SHOULD HA VE BEEN GRANTED BE-
CAUSE OF AN INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN THE CHARGES. 
When the State rested, the only evidence before the 
Court to sustain the charge in Count 2 was the testimony 
of the accomplice, Harold Zesiger, and the answer of 
Nelda Pratt to the question, "Did Roy participate in any 
regards?" her answer being, "Well, I'm not sure really, 
but I think I saw some other man holding some lights 
that looked like Roy, but I'm not sure." <Tr. 6) 
At this point, after the Motion to Dismiss was de-
nied, defendant was sworn and testified that on the day 
in question he went to work in Salt Lake City as usual 
at 4 p.m., worked through the night until the shift ended 
at 2 o'clock a.m., left for home and twenty minutes later 
arrived there in Woods Cross <Tr. 18, 20). This alibi 
was substantiated by his department superintendent and 
the co-worker <Tr. 53, 57). 
It must be remembered that it is the sworn testi-
mony of the State's witnesses that the entire alleged epi-
8 
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sode transpired from 9 o'clock p.m., August I, to 2:00 
a.m., August 2, 1969. <Tr. 3, 39, 40, 44). 
Upon arriving home defendant was called into the 
front room by his estranged wife who was present with 
her old boy-friend; handed a lamp; the wife turns it on 
and when defendant observes what is occurring, he re-
fuses to participate and goes to bed <Tr. 20, 21). 
Defendant denied the allegations of Count 2 in that 
he did not 1. cause Nelda Pratt, a minor under the age 
of 21 years, to be delinquent by causing her to pose nude 
in a lewd and suggestive manner (Tr. 19) (2) and tak-
ing photographic pictures at such time <Tr. 20). 
Nelda Pratt was recalled and testified as follows: 
<Tr. 34> 
"Q. How did you come to take your clothes 
off and pose for the pictures? 
A. I was asked to do it. 
Q. Who asked you? 
A. Lavonne. 
Q. Was Roy present when she asked you to 
do this? 
A. No. 
Q. Now then you, did you, you said you had 
two after, now two drinks afterwards, was 
this after the pictures were taken or dur-
ing the process of taking the pictures? 
A. It was after the pictures were taken. 
Q. Alright then during the time the pictures 
were taken do you remember everything 
that was going on at the time? 
A. Well, I knew the pictures were being 
9 
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<Tr. 36) 
taken and that somebody was holding a 
light and that Lavonne was suggesting 
poses. 
Q. Now was Lavonne helping you pose in 
any way? 
A. Well, in a way she was putting my legs 
and everything and my arms and every-
thing in different positions. 
Q. Was Roy doing any of this? 
A. Not that I can remember, no. 
Q. Alright can you say with any certainty 
that Roy was present at the time these 
pictures were, at the time you were pos-
ing in this lewd, or in this lewd manner 
and these pictures were being taken? 
A. No, because there was a light shining in 
my face and I couldn't sec past the light." 
"Q. Alright, and when these pictures were 
taken did Roy cause you to pose in any 
way? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he take any pictures of you? 
A. No he didn't. 
Q. And as fare (sic) as you were (tape not 
clear) (sic) he was not even present dur-
ing the time there \Vas this picture taking? 
A. As far as what I've said yes. 
Q. Yes what, yes he was or? 
A. Yes, he ,,·asn't." 
It was Roy Pratt who informed the police officials of 
10 
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the unusual activities at his home while he was away and 
placed in their possession the photographs. It must be 
remembered when it is asked how Roy Pratt gets involved 
at all that he and his wife are in the throes of a divorce 
and Lavonne's old boy-friend is involved. 
The defendant is not charged with being stupid or 
not doing or saying the proper thing when he has the 
lamp thrust into his hand and there is an attempt to impli-
cate him in the childish mess. Rather, he is charged with 
causing Nelda Pratt to pose in the nude and with taking 
photographic pictures of her at that time. 
There is no evidence to support the charge. The 
Court assumed defendant was present (Tr. 64) when all 
there was before the Court was the statement of Nelda, 
"I think he was, I'm not sure" (Tr. 6). No one has testi-
fied that the defendant caused Nelda Pratt to pose or that 
he took pictures of her at that time. Nelda Pratt has 
emphatically denied this. 
CONCLUSION 
There has been no proof, beyond a reasonable doubt 
to sustain the charge and defendant's Motion for Dismis-
sal at the conclusion of all of the evidence should have 
been granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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